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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more controversial aspects of constitutional law in recent
years involves the rights and privileges of the individual as he comes into
contact with governmental action. In particular, the assertion of civil
liberties by witnesses appearing before legislative investigating committees
has provoked bitter debates. The congressional quest for internal security
against the alleged menace of encroaching communism has been largely
responsible for creating a delicate and difficult situation. Consequently,
the United States Supreme Court has been confronted with the unenviable
task of having to decide who merits greater protection - the Congress in
its legislative endeavors to provide for the security of the entire nation
or the witness in his attempt to assert individual liberties.
A witness facing a congressional committee may always rely upon
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,' but this defense has decided disadvantages. 2 The
*Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Rcvlv. The writer wishes to express
his gratitude to Professor Clifford C. Alloway, University of Miami School of Law,
for his criticism and supervision in the preparation of this article. The writer also
wishes to acknowledge the constructive criticism of Professor Edward Sofen, Department
of Government, University of Miami.
1. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1957); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955); United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 933
(D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Enispak. 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (D.D.C. 1951),
aff'd, 203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950). See also Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 289 (1929); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 666 (1897).
2. See PRITCHETT, THE POLITICAL OFFENDER AND TIlE WARREN COURT 42-45

(1958).
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plea of self-incrimination undoubtedly carries a stigma, regardless of a
Supreme Court determination that the plea in itself has no sinister
connotation.- Te label of a "Fifth Amendment Communist" is certainly
undesirable. Moreover, when a question propounded to a witness using
this defense appears to be innocuous, it may be incumbent upon the
witness to give some indication why an answer to the question would be
self-incriminatory. 4 Still another deterrent to the plea is that the privilege
against self-incrimination may be waived by testimony given prior or
subsequent to the claiming of the privilege. The final obstacle is the
Immunity Act of 1954, whereby a witness may be compelled to testify before
a court, grand jury or congressional committee in a national security case
and thus be denied the privilege against self-incrimination, provided that
he be granted immunity from prosecution for any criminal activities lie may
reveal.6

Because of the above weaknesses in the self-incrimination plea, the
witness is searching for alternative constitutional defenses which would
prevent the committee of inquiry from compelling him to testify. In
Watkins v. United States,7 the Supreme Court opened what appeared to
the "conservatives" to be a Pandora's box of possible defenses. However,
in the recent case of Barenblatt v. United States," a five-man majority of
the Court succeeded in closing the lid of the box by a methodical destruction
of almost every conceivable plea found in the Watkins decision.
In this article the writer will endeavor to describe briefly the background
leading to the Watkins decision, to explore those defenses which were
considered by the Court in Watkins and to re-examine these defenses
in the light of the Barenblatt case.
3. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ. of New York City, 350 U.S. 551, 556-58
(1956). But,se Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 (1955).
4. [Tlraditionally the witness has not been allowed to be sole judge of the
character of the questions objected to; he is required to open the door wide enough
for the court to see that there is substance to his claim." 1arlan, J.,dissenting. Emspak

v. United States, 349 U.S. 190,-407 (1955). See also United States v. Rosen, 174 F.2d
187 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. Weisman, I11 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in past internal security cases has

held that the questions were not innocent in themselves, but called for answers which
would tend to incriminate the witness. See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Blan v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
(1950).
5. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Einspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
6. Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958). Although the Supreme
Court has not as yet passed upon the portions of the lmmunity Act relevant to congressional committees, it has upheld the constitutionality of the Act as it pertains to
witnesses appearing before grand juries or courts. Ulimann v. United States, 350
US.422 (1956).
7. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
8. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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II. Tim

BACKGROUND

A. The Pre-Watkins Era
I.

TIE INVESTIGATING POWER PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Until the post World War II years, litigation over legislative investigations occupied a rather insignificant portion of the Supreme Court's business.
In the earlier years the Court was concerned merely with establishing the
existence and extent of the congressional investigating power.
Although a statute enacted in 17989 made it fairly clear that Congress
intended to inakc use of an investigating power, it was not until the 1821
case of Anderson v. Dunn 9 that the first weak traces of a judicial awareness
of such a power can be found. Although the Anderson case did not involve
a congressional investigation, the Court recognized that there existed in
Congress a coercive power over non-members. This recognition is basic
to the proposition that unless Congress has the use of compulsory process
at its disposal, the value and effect of the investigating power would be
greatly diminished.
Congress, in 1857, attempted to support the investigatory power with
judicial sanctions. In that year Congress enacted a statute which provided:
That any person summoned as a witness by the authority of
either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers
upon any matter before either House, or any committee of either
I-louse of Congress, who shall wilfully make default, or who,
appearing, shall refuse to answer any question pertinent to the
matter of inquiry in consideration before the House or Committee
by which he shall be examined, shall in addition to the pains and
penalties now existing, be liable to indictment as and for a
misdemeanor, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
thereof. ..

.11

Several years after the enactment of the above statute, the Supreme
Court in the case of Kilbourn v. Thompson 12 was confronted for the first
9. "SECTION 1. Be it enacted . . . , That the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, a chairman of a committee of the whole, or a chairman
of a select committee of either house, shall be empowered to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses, in any case under their examination." 1 Stat. 554, cl. 36
(1798). Six years earlier the House of Representatives had appointed a select committee
to inquire into the defeat of General St. Clair. 3 ANNALS OF CoNs. 1106 (1791-93).
10. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1.821). The House of Representatives had adjudged
Anderson, who was not a member of the House, "guilty of a breach of the privileges of
the I-louse and of a high contempt of the dignity and authority of the same." Although
the offense committed was not mentioned by the Court, it appeared from argmnent
of counsel that Anderson had attempted to bribe a congressman. Id. at 217.
11. 11 Stat. 155, ch. 19, § 1 (1857). The current counterpart of Section 1
of this act is found in 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). A criminal indictment is more serious
than an exercise by Congress of its own contempt power, since punishment by Congress
is limited to an imprisonment which may not he extended beyond the session of
Congress in which the contempt occurred. Marshall v. Cordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542
(1917); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.(6 Wheat.) 204, 230 (1821).
12. 103 U.S. 168 (1881). This was an action for false imprisonment brought by
a recalcitrant witness against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives.
The House had relied upon its own contempt power rather than upon the Act of 1857.

384
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time with litigation over a congressional investigation. A committee of the
House of Represcntatives was authorized to investigate a real-estate pool
and settlement which, at the time, was being considered by a federal
district court in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Supreme Court held the
subject matter of the investigation to be within the function of the
judiciary and, therefore, beyond the purview of the legislative branch of
the government. The Court gratuitously announced that neither House
of Congress possessed a "genera] power of making inquiry into the
private affairs of the citizen.' 3 Since Congress had exceeded its power in
authorizing the investigation, "the committee ...had no lawful authority

to require Kilbourn to testify as a witness beyond what lie voluntarily chose
to tell. . . ."" Clearly, Kilbourn v. Thompson, standing alone, was not

indicative of unlimited power in Congress to make investigations and
compel testimony.'5
In re Chapman,' decided in 1897, involved a Senate committee
investigation into charges that Senators were yielding to corrupt influences
in considering a tariff bill. Since the inquiry related to the integrity and
fidelity of Senators in the discharge of their duties, the Court found the
subject matter of the investigation to be uniquely within the jurisdiction
of the Senate. Consequently, witnesses could be compelled to appear and
testify. The high tribunal also sustained the constitutionality of the
Act of 1857.
In MeGrain v. Daugherty,7 a 1927 decision, the Supreme Court
considered the earlier cases and then proclaimed that "the power of
inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.""' With this statement, the Court
broke away from the confinements of the Kilbourn decision and expanded
the possible subject matter for congresisonal investigation well beyond
that which was upheld in the Chapnnan case. Although the Court continued
to maintain that Congress was not invested with general power to inquire
into private affairs, the existence of the investigatory power could never
again be open to doubt. In the McGrain case a Senate committee which
was authorized to investigate charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in
the Department of Justice had served a subpoena on the Attorney
13. Id. at 190.
14. Id. at 196.
15. One writer noted two factors which may have accounted for the rathet
narrow decision. (1) With the exception of Mr. Justice Strong, who was in ill health
at the time of the decision, none of the members of the Court had any major legislative
experience. (2) The Court was not thoroughly enlightened by counsel, although there
existed a large mass of legislative precedents in Parliament, in the Colonial and State
Legislatures and in Congress. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation. 40 IlARv. L. Rvv. 153, 214-15 (1926).
16. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

17. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
18. Id. at 174.
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General's brother commanding him to appear and testify. However, the
witness failed to appear. The Court found that since the functions of
the Justice Department were subject to congressional regulation and its
activities depended upon congressional appropriations, "the subject was one
on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by
information which the investigation was calculated to elicit."' 1 As a

result, the Court concluded that the investigation was ordered for a legitimate object and that the witness wrongfully refused to appear and give
testimony pertinent to the inquiry.
Two years after the McCrain case the Supreme Court in Sinclair v.
United States20 upheld a Senate committee investigation into the leasing
of naval oil reserves by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of
the Interior. The case is significant primarily for the Court's consideration
of the defense of pertinency. Although the witness was unsuccessful in his
contentions, the Court stressed the fact that the questions propounded
to the witness must be pertinent to the subject matter under investigation.
added
In the two decades following the Sinclair case, the Supreme Court
21
little to the development of the congressional investigating power.
2.

THE INVESTICATING POWER DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR 11

After World War II, the Supreme Court reorientated its approach
toward the congressional committee. The high tribunal was no longer concerned with proving the existence of the power of inquiry and the
compulsory process to enforce it. Instead, the Court began to focus its
attention on the rights and privileges of the individual who had to appear
before the committees. The change of emphasis had a disrupting effect on
the Court. Whereas all the previous decisions had been marked with accord
and unanimity, the new series of cases were frequently accented by dissension
22
among the several Justices.
The post-war cases centered around a new type of investigation conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee. The Committee
19. Id. at 177.

20. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).

21. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (Court
upheld a warrant of arrest directing a non-member of the Senate to appear and answer
questions pertaining to alleged fraud and unlawful practices in connection with the
nomination and election of a Senator); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935)
(Court upheld the power of the Senate to cite for contempt a witness charged with
having permitted the removal and destruction of papers which he had been subpoenaed
to produce); United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937) (Court upheld a conviction
for perurious statements made before a Senate committee investigating campaign
expenditures in Senatorial elections).
22. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (5-4); Sacher v. United
States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958) (6-2); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(6-1): Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955) (6-3); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955) (6-3); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (8-1); United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349 (1950) (5-2); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323 (1950) (5-2); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949) (5-4); Christoffel
v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949) (5-4); United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 838
(1948), denying cert. 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) (5-4).
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had first been established by the House of Representatives in 1938.23 After
functioning as a special committee, it was raised to the level of a standing
committee in 1945.24 The Committee throughout the years became more
interested in exposing subversion, or alleged subversion, than in gathering
facts for legislative action. One writer has noted that in the first ten years
of its existence the only legislation proposed by the Committee and
enacted by Congress was a rider to an appropriation bill which would serve
to temiinatc the salaries of three governmental employees. 2 5 The Supreme
Court later invalidated the rider as a bill of attainder.28 In 1952, Professor
Robert K. Carr made the following comment:
No Congressional investigating committee in history has provoked
more controversy or criticsm than has the Un-American Activities
Committee of the House of Representatives. No such committee
has been more bitterly attacked or more vigorously defended. To
some Americans it has constituted one of the gravest threats to
civil liberty our nation has ever known; in less than a decade it
has managed to create and impose a loyalty standard upon the
nation that has dangerously narrowed our traditional freedoms
of thought, expression, and association. To other Americans the
committee has been our chief bulwark against subversion; almost
singlehandly it has saved the nation against enslavement by the
Communists .27

The first significant cases concerning the Un-American Activities Committee were decided on the federal court of appeals level in the late
1940's. The Second Circuit in United States v. Josephson28l and the District
of Columbia Circuit in Barsky v. United States"9 and in Lawson v. United
States20 upheld the authority of the Committee as against various constitutional and legal arguments.
Until 1955, the United States Supreme Court refused to write any
significant opinion concerning the constitutionality of Congress's new use
of its investigating power. The Court denied certiorari in josephson,a1

See

23. 11. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 CoNe. Rrc. 7568, 7586 (1938).
24. 11. Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CoN. REc. 10, 15 (1945).
25. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, § 304, 57 Stat. 450 (1943).
EziRuSON & HARFIt,

POLITICAL

& CIVIL

RIGHTS IN

THE

UNITED

STATES
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(1st ed. 1952). See also Josephson v. United States, 165 F.2d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 1947),
cart, denied, 333 U.S. 838 (19481. But see House Comm. on Un-American Activities,
Investigation of Un-American Activities and Propaganda, I1. R. Rrp. No. 2742, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1947). Tn 1948 the Un-American Activities Committee was
responsi'ble for reporting out- the Mundt-Nixon Bill. which formed the basis for the
Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1952).
26. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (19461.
27. Caa. IE IloUsE CoNfrT'ri. oN UN-AMERCAN AcrIVITIES 1 (1952).

28. 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cart denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).

29. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cart. denied. 334 U.S. 843 (1948). Accord, Dennis
v. United States, 171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948). affd. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).30. 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
31. 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
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Barsky,3 2 and Lawson.3 3 In the 1953 case of United States v. Rulnely,3'
involving the authority of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, the witness argued the First Amendment. However, the Court by
narrowly construing the authorizing resolution of the Committee, avoided
having to decide the constitutional issue. In another case the Court would
not discuss the merits of the investigation because the witness had fled the
country.35 In five other congressional investigation cases decided in this
period, the Court limited its consideration to technical and evidentiary
matters. 36

In 1955, the Supreme Court for the first time dealt with the constitutional arguments of witnesses appearing before the Un-American Activities
Committee. In three decisions based upon the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court reviewed and reversed contempt convictions. 37 These decisions were indicative of the liberal approach the
Supreme Court was to take two years later in the Watkins case.
B. The Watkins Case
1.

TIE FACTS

On April 29, 1954, John T. Watkins appeared as a witness before a
Subcommittee of the Un-American Activities Committee, which at the
time was allegedly investigating labor union activities. After other witnesses
had testified to Watkins' connection with the Communist Party, he fully
disclosed his past political associations and activities. Watkins further
offered to answer any questions concerning persons whom he knew to be
members of the Communist Party and whom he believed to be continuing
their membership. He refused, however, to answer any questions with
respect to others with whom he had associated. Watkins expressly did not
plead the privilege against self-incrimination, but rather challenged the
pertinency of the questions to the work of the Committee and the right
of the Committee to undertake the public exposure of persons because of
their past activities.
Criminal proceedings were initiated against Watkins for his refusal to
answer questions. He was subsequently found guilty of contempt of Con32. 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
33. 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
34. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
35. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949).
36. United States v. Fleisehman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) (Sufficiency of evidence
to sustain a conviction of a witness who failed to produce papers); United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (Necessity for the presence of a quorum of the Committee
at the time the witness failed to produce records); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S.

258 (1950) (Defect in the voir dire examination of the jury in a contempt of Congress
conviction); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950)(Defect in the voir dire
examination of the jury in a contempt of Congress conviction); Christoffel v. United
States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949) (Necessity for the presence of a quorum of the Committee
at the time of the alleged perjurious testimony).
37. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955); Emspak v. United States,
349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
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gress. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals, one judge dissenting,
reversed the conviction, but upon rehearing en bane, two judges dissenting,
the court affirmed the conviction." Upon a writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.3 9
Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred spccially and Mr. Justice Clark dissented. justices Burton
and W hittaker did not take part in the decision.
2.

THE INVESTIGATING POWER AND ITS GENERAL LIMITATIONS

After stating the facts in the case, the Chief Justice examined the
scope of the power of inquiry:
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent
in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose
of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes
Federal Government to expose corruption,
into departments of the
40
inefficiency or waste.

Having made these concessions, Mr. Chief Justice Warren in summary
fashion considered the limitations on the investigating power:
No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible .... The
Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of
governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give
evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms
of speech,4 press, religion, or political belief and association be
abridged.
3. TIHE

FIRST AMENDMENT,

VAGUENESS AND PERTINENCY

The major portion of the Chief Justice's opinion dealt with the three
specific defenses of the First Amendment, vagueness and pertinency. Briefly,
the arguments of the majority were as follows:
An investigation is clearly subject to the commands of the First
Amendment. Although the First Amendment does not bar all congressional
inquiries, the Court must find that the investigation is justified by a public
need. Otherwise there is danger of encroaching upon the individual's
38. Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
39. Vatkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). For an excellent casenote
on the Watkins case, see 106 U. PA. L. Rr.v. 124 (1957).
40. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
41. id. at 187-88.
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right to privacy or abridging his liberty of speech, press, religion or
assembly. "[T]here is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
42
exposure."
As Congress must bear the responsibility of insuring that compulsory
process is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose, it is incumbent
upon Congress to explicitly designate the jurisdiction and purpose of the
investigating committee. The authorizing resolution of the Un-American
Activities Committee4 ' apparently did not meet the Chief Justice's standard
4
of clarity. "
Under the applicable statute, 45 a witness can be subject to criminal
penalties only if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to the "question
under inquiry." Hence, the witness cannot be compelled to respond to
questions outside the scope of the subject under inquiry. In determining
the pertinency of the questions, the witness is entitled to some guidance,
be it the authorizing resolution, remarks of the chairman or members
of the committee, or the obvious nature of the proceedings.
4.

TIE HOLDING

Despite the merit and eloquence of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
contentions, the actual holding in the case is probably somewhat limited
as evidenced by the following two paragraphs:
Unless the subject has been made to appear with undisputable
clarity, it is the duty of the investigating body, upon objection
of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the
subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the
propounded questions are pertinent thereto. To be meaningful,
the explanation must describe what the topic under inquiry is and
the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate
to it.

The statement of the Committee Chairman [that the Subcommittee was investigating "subversion and subversive propaganda"], in response to petitioner's protest, was woefully inadequate
to convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the
questions to the subject under inquiry. Petitioner was thus not
accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within
his rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
invalid under the Due
6
(Footnote omitted.) 4
42. Id. at 200.
43. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
45. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
46. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957). In connection with
the holding of the case Professor Pritchett notes: "''here has been a widespread
tendency to read into Chief Justice Warren's decision in the Watkins cse more
than is probably there. It is only by contrast with the Court's previous submissions that
the Watkins ruling seems startling bold." PRITCIIFTT, liE POLITICAL OFFENDER AND THE
WXAREEN COURT 36 (1958).

390
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5. THE CONCURRENCE AND TIE DISSENT

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, based the decision
solely upon the fact that when Watkins refused to answer, he was not
made aware of the pertinency of the information he might have given.
Mr. justice Clark, in his dissent, was concerned over the majority's
curbing of the informing function of Congress. The Justice discounted
the First Amendment arguments by noting that there is no general privilege
of silence. He found the authorizing resolution to be sufficiently clear,
since the Court is "bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body in granting authority to the Committee was with a legitimate object
if [the action is capable of being so construed." 4 Mr. Justice Clark
believed that the Committee was also able to satisfy the requisite of
pertinency. As Congress may inquire into the subject of communist
activity, it may through its committees seek to identify individual members
of the Communist Party. "The pertinency of the questions is highlighted
by the need for the Congress to know the extent of communism in labor
8
4

unions."

ill.

Tin CURRENT PICTURE

A. Introduction to Barenblatt
The investigating power of Congress was again examined by the
Supreme Court in the 1959 case of Barenblatt v. United States.49 This
decision, which was favorable to the Un-American Activities Committee,
represents the current delineation of the rights of the individual vis-5-vis
the committee of inquiry.
On June 28, 1954, Barenblatt, a former teaching fellow at the University
of Michigan and an instructor in psychology at Vassar College, appeared
as a witness before a Subcommittee of the Un-American Committee. The
Subcommittee, at the time, was investigating alleged communist infiltration
into the field of education. Barenblatt refused to answer whether he was
a member of the Communist Party, whether he had ever been a member
of the Party or whether he had ever been a member of the Haldane
Club of the Communist Party while attending the University of Michigan.5
The witness in his refusal expressly disclaimed reliance upon the Fifth
Amendment which was interpreted to mean the privilege against selfincrimination. Instead, he objected generally to the right of the Sub47. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 228 (1957).
,8.Id. at 230.
49. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
50. The witness's refusal to answer the three questions constituted three of the
five counts brought against him. The other two counts, involved the witness's refusal
to testify as to whether he knew one Francis Crowley as a member of the Communist
Party or whether he (Barenblatt) was a member of the Ilaldane Club while a student
at the University of Michigan Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions. The Supreme
Court expressly excluded these latter questions from consideration.

1960]
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committee to inquire into his political and religious beliefs or any other
personal or private affairs or associational activities. 5'
Criminal proceedings, subsequently brought against Barcnblatt, resulted
in a conviction for contempt of Congress. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the conviction.52 The case first reached the
Supreme Court in 1957, the year of the Watkins decision. Consequently,
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to that court for further consideration in the light of
Watkins."3 The court of appeals reaffirmed the conviction.54 In a 5-4
decision the Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals.- On the Supreme
Court level, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Frankfurter, Clark, XVhittaker and Stewart. Mr. Justice Black
dissented. He was joined by Mr. Chief Justice 'Warren and Justices Douglas
and Brennan.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion was almost a duplicate of the form and
style prescribed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Vatkins v. United States.
The difference was that Mr. Justice Harlan arrived at conclusions antithetical to those of the Chief Justice. Similar to the reasoning of the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan began by briefly discussing the broadness
of the congressional power of inquiry. 1-Ie, likewise, recognized that the
power had limitations, which appeared to be twofold: 1) Congress may
not inquire into matters which are the exclusive concern of either the
Judiciary or the Executive; and 2)

"Congress

. . . must exercise its

powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action, more particularly ... the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights." 0

The-Justice then discussed the three major defenses considered in Watkins.
B, The Vice of Vagueness
The first issue discussed in Barenblatt was whether the compelling
of testimony by the Subcommittee was either legislatively authorized or
constitutionally permissible in view of the alleged vagueness of Rule XI,
51. The grounds for Barenblatt's objection were set forth in a previously prepared
memorandum which he was allowed to file with the Subcommittee. 'he United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in deciding the Barenblatt case made
the following comment on the memorandum:
The statement can best be described as a lengthy legal brief attacking the
jurisdiction of the committee to ask appellant any questions or to conduct any
inquiry at all, based on the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the prohibition
against bills of attainder, and the doctrine of separation of powers. This brief
cited more than twenty Supreme Court decisions, some of which do not
concern the congressional power of investigation; and, in several instances,
dissenting opinions were cited. Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875,
879 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
52. Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875(D.C. Cir. 1957).
53. Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957).
54. Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
55. Bareriblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
56. Id. at 112.
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§ 17(b), 57 the authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities
Committee.
A valid law must meet a standard of certainty, sufficient to make the
law capable of comprehension,' 8 especially where the statute attempts
to define a crime. 9 When a federal law fails to attain this standard, the
statute is void as a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. These principles appear to be applicable to the
authorizing resolutions of congressional committees,0 ' since a refusal to
2
testify may subject the witness to criminal penalties.
The defense of vagueness, in part, stems from a traditional limitation
placed upon the congressional investigation by the Supreme Court in
Kilbourn v. Thonpson.63 In that case the Court demanded, in effect, that
a congressional investigation be supported by a legislative purpose and
that the authorizing resolution specify that purpose.6 4 Kilbourn condemned

57. H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99

CoNG. REc. 15, 18, 24 (1953).
58. E.g., Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). See 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 472 (1944);
82 C.r.S. Statutes § 68 (1953).
59. See United States v. tarriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174 (1952); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 347 (1952);
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
See also Annot., 97 L. Ed. 203 (1953); Annot., 96 L. Ed. 347 (1952); Annot.,
83 L. Ed. 893 (1939).
60. See A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 238 (1925),
interpreting Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223
(1951); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The Weeds and Cohen cases
also indicated that vagueness contravened the Sixth Amendment. A state law failing
to attain the requisite standard of certainty contravenes the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
61. This is inferred from the several congressional investigation cases in which
the issue of vagueness was discussed by the courts. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); United States
v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957). See also Note, Constitutional Limitations
on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 417, 429 (1947).
However, in Barsky, the court claimed that "there is a difference between the
particularity required in the specification of a criminal act and that required in the
authorization of an investigation .... ." Barsky v. Unted States, 167 F.2d 241, 248
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). In the 'Peck case the court appeared
to decide the question of vagueness tinder the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting in Barenblatt, indicates that the degree of certainty is higher where First
Amendment freedoms are involved. The implications of the First Amendment will be
discussed on pp. 402.409 infra.
62. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958) makes refusal to testify before a congressional
committee a misdemeanor under certain circumstances. See note 1I supra and accompanying text.
63. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
64. "What was this committee charged to do? To inquire into the nature and
history of the real-estate pool. How indefinitel . . . . We are of the opinion . .
that the resolution of the House of Representatives authorizing the investigation was
... Id. at 195, 196.
in excess of the power conferred in that body by the Constitution;.
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the idea of a congressional inquiry interfering with a judicial function. e5
After the Kilbourn decision, in congressional investigation cases not involving
subversive activities, the federal courts have found the legislative purpose
to exist in such areas as: integrity and purity of Senators, 8 misfeasance

and nonfeasance of executive departments, 7 nomination and election of
Senators, 8 violation of rights of free speech and assembly and undue
influence with the right of labor to organize and bargain sollectively,
old-age pension plans,70 sale and disposition of property acquired by the
United States government in connection with the national defense and
the war effort, 7' organized crime, 72 operations of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, 73 and improper practices of organized labor.74
In re Chapman75 broadened the requisite content of the authorizing
resolution by declaring that "it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when
the investigation was concluded."7 6 McGrain v. Daugherty" upheld an
authorizing resolution which revealed a subject on which legislation might
be had, although it did not expressly avow that the investigation was in
aid of legislation. The current position of the federal courts is that,
irrespective of the motives of individual members of the committee, "when
the general subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can

65. "[V]e are of the opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded
the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly
exercised by another branch of the government, because it was in its nature clearly
judicial." Id. at 192. See also United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C.
1956).
66. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
67. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135 (1927). See also United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
68. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937); Barry v. United States ex rel
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S. 376 (1928).
See also Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1935). Technically this is an
area where the Constitution explicity places judicial power in Congress. See U.S. CoNsr.
art. 1, § 5, cl.1.
69. United States v. Creech, 21 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1937).
70. Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
664 (1938).
71. United States v. Fields, 6 F.R.D. 203 (D.D.C. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948). See also United States v. Fallbrook
Pub. Util. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
72. United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952). See also
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); Bowers v. United States,
202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
73. Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1015 (1954).
74. United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959). See also Brewster v.
United States, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
75. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
76. Id. at 670. A congressional committee's "power to conduct a hearing for
legislative purposes is not measured by recommendations for legislation or their absence."
Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664
(1938). Accord, United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D.D.C. 1957).
77. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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legislate, and when the information sought might aid in congressional
consideration, a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed." ' 8
Although the cases recognize the authority of Congress to investigate
subversive activities, 75 Rule XI, § 17(b) and its predecessors have been
under continual attack."0 Rule XI, § 17(b) reads:
The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by
subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American
propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within
the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that
is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by
our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto
that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.81
In Barsky v. United States 2 a relatively early case on the Un-American
Activities Committee, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that "Congress has power to make an inquiry of an individual which
may elicit the answer that the witness is a believer in Communism or a
member of the Communist Party [and the predecessor of Rule XI, § 17(b)l
is sufficiently clear, definite and authoritative to permit this particular
committee to make that particular inquiry."" In an elaboration on the
validity of the authorizing resolution, Judge Prettynn, speaking for the
majority, reasoned:
It is said that the Resolution is too vague to be valid. Perhaps
the one phrase "un-American propaganda activities" taken alone
as it appears in subclause (i) of the Resolution, would be subject
to that condemnation. But the clause, above-quoted, "subversive
and un-American propaganda that . . . attacks the principle of
the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution," which
is subclause (ii), is definite enough. It conveys a clear meaning,
78. United States v. Orrnan. 207 F.2d 148, 157 (3d Cir. 1953); Morford v.
United States, 176 F.2d 54, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S.
258 (1950); United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 306 (DD.C. 1959).
79. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cit. 1954); Barsky v.
United States, 167 F.2d 241, 246 (I,C, Cir.). cert. denied, 334 US. 843 (1948);
United States v. Josephson, 165 F,2d 82. 90 (2d Cir. 1947), cert, denied. 333 U.S.
838 (1948); United States v, Shelton, 148 F, Supp. 926, 934 (D.D.C. 1957); United
States v. Knowles, 148 F. Snpp, 832, 836 (1).D.C. 1957); United States v. Deutch,
147 F. Supp. 89. 91 (D).DC. 1956). Although all the above cases preceded Watkins,
the authority of Congress to investigate subversive activities appears never to have been
questioned by the Supreme Court.
80. Barblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 136-140 (1959) (dissent); \Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201-06 (1957); l3arskV v. United States, 167 F.2d
241, 260-63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (dissent); Josephson v.
United States, 165 F.2d 82, 95-97 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948)
(dissent),
81. 1. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Coxe. Ri-c. 15, 18, 24 (1953).
82. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
83, Id. at 250. hn Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51-52 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950), the first part of the above quote was upheld
as against a claim that it was obiter dicta.
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and that is all that is required. The principles which underlie the
,form of the existing government

in

this country are well-enough

defined in basic documents preceding the Constitution, are obvious
in the undebated unanimity which prevailed onl many basic propositions in the Convention of 1787, were stated during the consideration of the adoption of the Constitution, are stated in countless
scholarly works upon principles of government, and, indeed, are
taught even to high school students in our schools. .. .(Footnotes
omitted.) 84
It is.interesting to compare the language of Mr. Chief Justice Warren
in Vatkins v. United States, decided nine years after Barsky:
It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing
resolution. Who can define the meaning of "un-American"? What
is that single, solitary "principle of the form of government as
guaranteed by our Constitution"? (Footnote omitted). 5
The impact of the Chief Justice's attack affected at lcast one lower
federal court. Thc District Court for the District of Columbia in the
case of United States v. Peck8 was confronted with the authorizing
resolution of the Internal Security Subcommittee,, 7 which is the Senate
counterpart to the Un-American Activities Committee. The court compared
the Senate resolution to Rule XI, § 17(b) and found the Senate resolution
to be equally vague and indefinite. An earlier case of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which had held the resolution to be valid, 88
was distinguished by the fact that the case was decided prior to Watkins.
Although the Peck case did not reach a higher tribunal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Sacher v. United States,89 decided
seven and a half months aftcr Peck, held the authorizing resolution of
the Internal Security Committee to be clear and definite. Since the
84. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 247-48 (D.C. Cir.), cart. denied,
334 U.S. 843 (1948). Followed in Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473, 474
(D.C.Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950).
85. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202 (1957).
86. 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957).
87. "Resolved, that the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing :;tudy
and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal
Security Act of 1950; (2) the admnistration, operation, and enforcement of other laws
relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the Internal Security of the United
States- and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States,
its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and
infiltration by persons who are or may be tinder the domination of the foreign
government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any othei
movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and
violence." S. Res. 366, § 1,81st Cong?, 2d Sess., 96 CoNc. REc. 16872 (1950). The
court was concerned primarily with subsection (3).
88. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The issue as
to vagueness, per se, was not actually considered in the Lattimore case. See also United
States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D.D.C. 1957).
89. 252 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 576 (1958). It is
interesting to note that the court referred only to subsections (I) and (2) of S. Res.
366, § 1,supra note 87. Sacher v. United States, 252 F.2d 828, 831-32 (D.C. Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
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Supreme Court thereafter reversed Sacher on other grounds, 0 the constitutional status of the Internal Security Subcommittee after the Watkins
decision was as nebulous as that of the Un-American Activities Committee.
Doubt as to the clarity of the authorizing resolution of the UnAmerican Activities Committee, and presumably that of the Internal
Security Subcommittee, terminated with the rendering of the Barenblatt
decision. The Supreme Court in Barenblatt expressly hcld that Rule XI,
§ 17(b) was not constitutionally infirm on the score of vagueness.
Mr. Justice Harlan first considered the vagueness issue within the
context of Watkins. He readily disposed of this contention by declaring
that the Supreme Court had reversed the Watkins conviction solely on the
ground that the witness had not been adequately apprised of the subject
matter of the investigation or the pertinency thereto of the questions that
the witness had refused to answer. Examining Rule XI, § 17(b) independently of Watkins, the Justice believed that although § 17(b) when
read in isolation might be vague, a "persuasive gloss of legislative history"
showed "that in pursuance of its legislative concerns in the domain of
'national security' the House has clothed the Un-American Activities
Committee with pervasive authority to investigate Communist activities in
this country." 9' Apparently, the "vice of vagueness" was purged by the
actions of the House of Representatives which continued the life of the
Committee year after year with no diminution in the Committee's powers.
Petitioner's final contention under the defense of vagueness was that
Rule XI, § 17(b) should be construed to exclude the field of education
from the Committee's compulsory authority. Mr. Justice Harlan again
utilized the legislative gloss doctrine and found that, inasmuch as the
Committee had been investigating without restraint the field of education
since 1938, legislative approval was evident.
The dissenters, led by Mr. Justice Black, quoted with approval the
words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Watkins v. United States. Mr. Justice
Black believed that the Court in prior cases had "emphasized that the
'vice of vagueness' is especially pernicious where legislative power over
an area involving speech, press, petition and assembly is involved."9 12 Since

the majority demanded that the witness balance his rights with
requirements of the state, 3 the Justice believed that the witness
entitled to know with sufficient certainty the compelling need for
responses. To the dissenters, this need was expressed neither in Rule

the
was
his
XI,

90. Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
91. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 118 (1959).
92. Id. at 137. To support his statement Mr. Justice Black cited: Scull v. Virginia,

359 U.S. 344 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S, 242 (1937). The
Scull, Winters and lHerndon cases were decided under the Fourteenth Amendment and
did not involve congressional action.
93. The balancing of the interests test will be discussed on pp. 407-408 infra.
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§ 17(b) nor in the House's several acquiescences in the Committee's
assertions of power.
If Congress wants ideas investigated, if it even wants them investigated in the field of education, it must be prepared to say so
expressly and unequivocally. And it is not enough that a court
through exhaustive research can establish, even conclusively, that
Congress wished to allow the investigation. I can find no such
unequivocal statement here. . . . I would hold that [Rule XI,
§ 17(b)] is too broad4 to be meaningful and cannot support
petitioner's conviction.
C. Pertinency to the Subject Under Inquiry
The second issue considered in Barenblatt was whether the witness
was adequately apprised of the pertinency of the Subcommittee's questions
to the subject under inquiry.
Although the W/atkins case appears to hold that the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment protects a witness from the necessity of answering
questions beyond the scope of the inquiry,9 5 the cases generally are more
concerned with the application of the statute which provides for indictment
for a misdemeanor upon a witness's refusal to testify before a congressional
committee. 0 This act specifies that criminal penalties attach only where
the question is "pertinent" to the subject under inquiry. Technically there
are two facets to this statutory requisite: I) What is the subject matter
of the investigation; and 2) How do the questions relate to the subject
matter? The former question could have been treated under the topic of
vagueness, i.e. does the authorizing resolution sufficiently show the subject
matter of the investigation? However, inasmuch as both Watkins and
Barenblatt tend to combine both facets, this article will treat the entire
problem under the heading of pertinency.
Both the Chapman and McGrain cases recognized the possible defense
of pertinency, 1 but the Supreme Court did not fully discuss the issue
until Sinclair v. United States.98 In that case the Court laid down two
rules. First, it is incumbent upon the United States, as prosecutor, to plead
and show that the question pertains to some matter under investigation. 9
94. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 (1959).
95. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
96. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
97. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927); In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661, 669 (1897).
98. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
99. Id. at 296-97. Accord, Kenney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir.
1954); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v.
Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832, 935 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp.
791, 793 (D. Mass. 1956); United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D.
Ohio 1952). Compare Bowers v. United States, 202 F. 2d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953):
"But again we point out that the Sinclair case says the United States must plead
and show pertinency. This means, we think, that when a question is not in itself or
because of its context plainly pertinent, the United States must somehow show its
pertinency to the court .... "
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Second, the issue of pertinency, like relevancy at the trial of issues in
court and materiality of false testimony in a prosecution for perjury, is
to be determined by the court as a qluestion of law.' 00 To decide this issue
the court should determine "whether the facts called for by the question
were so related to the subjects covered by the [authorizing] resolutions that
such facts reasonably could be said to be 'pertinent to the question under
inquiry."101

Since Sinclair an extensive body of law has been promulgatcd to deal
with the amorphorous concept of pertinency. Although the courts ultimately
determine whether the questions propounded are pertinent to the subject
matter, it is, nevertheless, incumbent upon the witness to decide correctly
for himself the pertinency of the questions,' 02 Should the witness make
an erroneous decision, even in good faith, and refuse to answer a question
which a court later dccides is pertinent, he would still be subject to the
crininal penalties as provided by statute.103 Recognizing the harshness of

this situation, the courts have attempted to alleviate the burden of the
witness.

04

As mentioned above, the Government has the burden of proving
pertinency. The rationale for this, as developed by the later cases, is that
the statute makes pertinency an clement of the crime of refusing to testify

100. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99 (1929). Accord, Keeney v.
United States, 218 F2d 843, 845 (D.C. CiT. 1954); Morford v, United States, 176
1F.2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 358 (1950); United
States v. I)iCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D.Ohio 1952). United States v. Orman,
207 F.2d 148, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1953), modified this principle so that the issue of
pertinency may properly go to the jury where evidence aliunde is introduced. For
congressional investigating cases involving the issue of perjury, see United States v.
Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952); Maragon v. United States, 187 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932 (1951); Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir.
1935); United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959); United States v.
Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956); United States v. Creech, 21 F. Supp.
439 (D.D.C. 1937).
101. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99(1929). "When evidence is
taken by a committee, the pertinency of questions propOunded must be determined by
reference to the scope of the authority vested in the committee by the Senate." Barry
v. United States ex Tel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929) (dictum).
102. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957); Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154 (3d
Cir. 1953).
103. "To compound the problems of the witness, he must make a split-second
gamble as to pertinency. If he answers a question which he honestly thinks isnot
pertinent, he is allowing tle committee to inquire into areas of his private life which
niiv be unjustified by the resolution authorizing the investigation. If lie refuses to answer,
even thouglh in good faith, the committee may later cite him for contempt. He would
then find hinself subjected to penalties for his original refusal even though lie may now
be willing to answer after a court ruling as to pertinency." Lovell, Scoe of the Legislative
Investigational Power and Redress for its Abuse, 8 tIAsTIN s L. J: 276, 281 (1957).
104. "N'lthen Congress seeks to enforce the investigating authority through the
criminal process administered by the federal judiciary, the safeguards of criminal justice
become operative." Sachcr v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 (1958). See also Annot.,
99 L. Ed. 985 (1955).
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before a congressional committee. 05 In order for the Government to
sustain the burden it must show that: 1) the material sought or answers
requested relate to a legislative purpose which Congress can constitutionally
entertain; and 2) such material or answers fall within the grant of authority
actually made by Congress to the investigating committec. 10 6 "Presumption
or possibility of pertinency will not suffice."'
Consequently, an investigating committee may not, by excessively broad questions, engage in a
general "fishing cxpcdition . . . for the chance something discreditable

might turn up."'105 Pertinency, as indicated by the statute means pertinency
to the subject matter rather than to the person under interrogation, 10 9 but
pertinency is tested by the possible answer rather than the answer that would
have been 6oked in any particular case." 0 Therefore, a true and innocent
answer will not destroy pertinency."'
Aside from delineating what the prosecution must prove, the courts
have granted the witness certain rights in regard to the pertinency requirement. Inasmuch as pertinency is an clement of the criminal offense, the
objection to pertinency, unlike the personal privilege of self-incrimination,
is not waived when the witness fails seasonably to assert the objection." 2
Should the witness assert an objection, he is at the time of the interrogation
entitled to a clear-cut ruling by the committee on his objection.'' 3 It is
thus apparent that the chairman of the committee or a member thereof
has a duty to make known to the witness the relation of the questions
to the topic under inquiry. In this respect the position of the witness and the
interrogator are the reverse of a self-incrimination plea where the witness
may be bound to divulge why an answer would be incriminating." 4
Although the witness has been provided with various procedural
safeguards; the courts tend to tip the scales in the opposite direction by
105. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 1953); Bowers v. United
States, 202 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1953); DiCarlo v. United States, 102 F. Supp.
597, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
106. United States v. Ornan, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cit. 1953).
107. Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
108. United States v. Kamin, 135 F. Supp. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1955). "[A] congressional committee [ does not possess] the power to examine citizens indiscriminately
in the mere hope of stumbling upon valuable information and to cite them for contempt
if they refuse to answer .....
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154-55 (3d
Cir. 1953).
109. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 177 (D.C. Cit. 1952), aff'd, 345
U.S. 41 (1953). Accord, United States v. Ornan, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cit. 1953).
110. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 1953); United States
v. Kamin, 135 F. Supp. 382, 388 (D. Mass. 1955).
Ill. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 1953).
112. Ibid.; Bowers v. United States, 202 F2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1953). But see
United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791, 799-800 (D. Mass. 1956): "[Blut a
question need not be the ultimate in pertinency. If it is principally pertinent it need
not exclude every possible irrelvancy, at least unless there is objection by the witness ...
(Emphasis added).
113. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 21 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155. 165-66 (1955).
114. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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giving wide scope to the questions that may be asked of the witness. This
latitude was early illustrated by Circuit Judge Miller's comparison of a
court proceeding with a legislative investigation:
A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as
exhaustive as is necessary to make effective the constitutional
powers of Congress . . . A judicial inquiry relates to a case, and
the evidence to be admissible must be measured by the narrow
limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates all possible
cases which may arise thereunder and the evidence admissible must
be responsive to the scope of the inquiry, which generally is very
broad .... 115
In the sphere of subversive activities the pertinency claim has been
ardently pursued by recalcitrant witnesses. However, Lawson V. United
States,"" decided in 1949, expressly held that the Un-American Activities
Committee had the power to inquire whether the witness was a member
of the Communist Party or a believer in Communism. Apparently this
question is pertinent regardless of what topic the Un-American Activities
Committee, or the Internal Security Subcommittee is investigating. The
scope of the possible topics under inquiry also appears to expand the
range of pertinent questions. In the interest of national security the
courts have sanctioned investigations of communist infiltration into such
areas as motion pictures, 11t education, 18 labor," 9 and news dispensing.'
The claim of pertinency was pursued by Watkins and apparently by
Barenblatt. Inasmuch as Barenblatt v. United States limited the holding
of Watkins v. United States to the issue of pertinency, it is probably safe
to assume that Watkins is still good law as to that issue.
In Watkins, Mr. Chief Justice Warren recognized two interrelated
types of pertinency-jurisdictional pertinency and statutory pertinency.
Although the line of demarcation is far from clear, the former appears to
be in the nature of a due process requirement in that it restricts the
committee to "the missions delegatod to them," while the latter, derived
from the statute making refusal to testify a misdemeanor, requires that
the witness be informed of the precise subject matter of the inquiry and
the relation thereto of the questions.
Beginning his attack under statutory pertinency, the Chief Justice
demanded that the witness be informed as to the subject under inquiry.
115. Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
116. 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), eart denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).

117. Ibid.

118. United States v, Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (D.D.C. 1957); United
States v. Deritch, 147 F. Snpp. 89, 91-92 (D.D.C. 1956).
119. Ibid. See also Ilouse Comm. on Un-American Activities, Investigations of UnAmerican Activities and Propaganda, H. R. Rep. No. 2742, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
iv (1947): "In the opinion of the committee, the most serious penetration has been
within the labor unit .... "
120. United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D.D.C. 1957).
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He then discussed the full gamut of sources whereby the information could
be obtained. The first source was the authorizing resolution, but the
resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee was much too broad
to be infonnative. The opening statement of the chairman, who paraphrased the authorizing resolution and gave a general sketch of the past
efforts of the Un-American Activities Committee, added nothing toward
the discovery of the subject under inquiry. Although the full Committee
adopted a formal resolution which authorized the creation of the Subcommittee before which Vatkins appeared, the resolution shed no light
on the problem.
The Chief Justice then examined the proceedings in order to tackle
the Government's contention that the topic of inquiry concerned communist
infiltration into labor. The contention was rebutted by the fact that six of
the nine witnesses questioned had no connection with labor and seven
of the thirty persons about whom Watkins was interrogated were also
unconnected with organized labor.' 2' Finally, the "question under inquiry"
could have been disclosed when Watkins specifically made the pertinency
objection. The reply of the chairman that the Committee had been
established to investigate "subversion and subversive propaganda" was
unsatisfactory to the Court.2 2 In view of the dearth of guidance as to
both the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of the questions, the
conviction of Watkins for his refusal to testify was held to be invalid
23
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Watkins decision, concluded
with the following words:
[T]he actual scope of the inquiry the Committee was authorized
to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry
must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked
and not left, at best, in cloudiness.12 The
circumstances of this
4
case were wanting in these essentials.
As far as the holding on the pertinency claim in Barenblatt v. United
States, the principles enunciated in Watkins remain intact. Mr. justice
Harlan found that, unlike Watkins, Barenblatt failed to object on the

121. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, apparently was of the opinion that since only a
quarter of the persons about whom the witness was questioned were not labor people,
the proper inference was that the subiect under inquiry was Communism in organized
labor. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 227 (1957).
122. "Subversive and un-American propaganda," as used in the authorizing resolution
of the Un-American Activities Committee, appears to have satisfactorily identified the
subject under inquiry in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
123. As a result of this holding the pertinency issue was decided in favor of the
witness in Sacler v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958) and in United States v. Peck,
154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957).
124. Vatkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 217 (1957).
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score of pertinency. 2'- However, the Justice did not let the issue rest at
this point. He%went on to find that pertinency was made to appear with
"undisputed clarity."
To support the above finding, Mr. Justice Harlan pointed to the
following items: 1) The witness's prepared memorandum of constitutional
objections showed that lie was aware of the Subcommittee's authority
and purpose in questioning hin.' 20 2) 'The subject matter of the inquiry
had been identified at the commencement of the investigation as Communist
infiltration into the field of education."127 3) On the day Barenblatt
appeared the scope of the hearings was announced as "in the main
communism in education and the experience and background in the
party by Francis X. 1'. Crowley [dealing] with activities in Michigan,
Boston, and in some small degree, New York."' 28 4) Barenblatt heard
Crowley testify that Barenblatt was a former member of an alleged
communist student organization at the University of Michigan. 2 9 5) Barenblatt said nothing when the chairman informed the witness why he had
been called.' 0 6) "Unlike Watkins . . . petitioner refused to answer

questions as to his own Communist Party affiliations whose pertinency
of course was clear beyond doubt."' t
Exactly why Mr. justice Harlan elaborated on the non-existent
pertinency objection is open to speculation. Had the Justice pointed to
the fact that pertinency was a necessary clement in the Government's
case from which petitioner sought review and that the objection could
not be waived, there would have been ample justification for the extended
discussion. However, the Court was more concerned with whether the
witness was "adequately apprised' of the pertinency of the questions, than
with whether the prosecution had sustained its burden of proof. It thus
appears that the majority's treatment of the pertinency issue, after deciding
that the witness did not raise the objection, was essentially another attempt
to limit the application of Watkins. It is interesting to note that the
four dissenters in Barenblatt did not discuss the issue of pertinency.
1). The Evasive First Amendment
The third and final issue discussed in Barenblatt v. United States was
whether the questions petitioner refused to answer infringed upon rights
protected by the First Amendment.
125. Barenblatt had brought with him a mcmorandumn containing statements which
indicated that lie might wish to raise the pertinency objection. However, the objection
which the witness actually made contained a general challenge to the power of the
Subcommittee. See note 51 supra. Compare United States v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603, 611
(D.D.C. 1957).
126. There is doubt in the writer's mind whether this conclusion follows from
Barenblatt's memnorNndutn. See note 51 supra.
127. Barenhlatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 124 (1959).
128. Id. at 124-25.
129. Crowley immediately preceded Barenblatt on the witness stand.
130. The chairman had stated that Barenblatt had information about communist
activities in the United States which would be valuable to the Subcommittec.
arenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 125 (1959).
131.

19601

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING POWER

The First Amendment is undoubtedly the most nebulous defense
available to the witness. The courts have talked much about the issue
but have decided little. In many cases the dissents and the concurrences
in a Holmes-like manner have been more significant than the majority
opinions. 1 2 One student appropriately labeled judicial reaction to the
problem as "confusion and avoidance."' 1'3 The possibilities inherent in the
First Amendment range from non-application to a complete bar to the
compulsion of any testimony before a congressional committee. Indeed,
the cases have indicated that the entire problem is a matter of degree to
be decided in each instance.
When a witness pleads the First Amendment he may have several
things in mind. The First Amendment appears to have been used along
with the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment in order to
neutralize the stigma attached to the plea of self-incrimination. 3 4 When
pleaded alone the First Amendment, besides the obvious elements of
speech, press, assembly and religion, appears to include the concepts of
freedom of privacy, freedom from exposure and freedom to remain silent.
It is essentially these latter ideas which have becn examined and developed
by the various justices confronted with the plea of the First Amendment in

a congressional investigation.
Although not recognized as such, the defense of First Amendment
freedoms in congressional investigations probably had its genesis in
Kitbourn v. Thompson."' In that case it was stated that Congress did
not have the power to inquire into the "private affairs of citizens." The
right to privacy as a limitation on congressional investigatory power was
also recognized in In re Chaplman,' 0 McGrain v. Daugherty,'37 and
138
Sinclair v. United States.
In the late 1940's the First Amendment as a defense was specifically

discussed by the Second and District of Columbia Circuits. The Second
Circuit in United States v. Josephson,' 9 cast doubt upon the private
affairs doctrine of the Kilbourn case. However, the court, determined that
132. Id. at 134: United States v. Runmel, 345 U.S. 41, 53 (1953); Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241, 252 (1).C. Cir.), Let. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); United
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
133. Comment, 65 YALE L. J. 1159, 1163 (1956).
134. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (Refusal to answer based
on "primarily the first amendment, suppleniented by the fifth"); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (Refusal to answer based on "the first and fifth amendments," as well as "the first amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the
fifth amendment"); United States v. Kanin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956)
(Refusal to answer based partially on the First Amendment, enlarged at the trial to
include the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendnnts); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F.

Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951) (Refusal to answer based on "the First Amendment to the
Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment").
135. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
136. 166 U.S. 661, 668-69 (1897).
137. 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1926).
138. 279 U.S. 263, 291-95 (1929).
139. 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
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un-American propaganda was a matter which affected the very survival of
the United States Government and, consequently, was not the purely
personal concern of any one. The court also discounted the exposure
argument. In considering the First Amendment the court noted: "The
theory seems to be that the investigation of un-American or subversive
propaganda impairs in some way not entirely clear the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."1 40 The majority found nothing inconsistent between Congress's particular use of its fact finding power and
the protection offered by the First Amendment. On the other hand, Circuit
Judge Clark, in his dissent, believed that the right to speak and express
one's opinions was directly and obviously abridged. The Judge took
cognizance of the announced desire of the un-American Activities Committee that the persons it found guilty should forfeit their jobs in public
and private industry, be subject to prosecution for any collateral crimes
which may have been revealed and be exposed to public condemnation
in general.
Approximately three months later the District of Columbia Circuit
in Barsky v. United States"' paralleled the Josephson approach. Refuting
the contention that the "clear and present danger" doctrine142 should
determine whether the First Amendment had been violated, Judge Prettyman, speaking for the majority, claimed: "There is a vast difference between
the necessities for inquiry and the necessities for action. The latter may
be only when the danger is clear and present, but the former is when
danger is reasonably represented as potential."'' 45 Assuming that even the
timid and those sensitive to the stigma of unpopularity cannot be
unconstitutionally restrained in freedom of thought, the Judge apparently
decided that the public necessity in being informed of subversive activities
outweighed the private rights in free expression. The majority was opposed,
by a vigorous dissent from Judge Edgerton. The dissenting Judge analogized
the implied investigating power to the explicitly granted taxing power,
which had previously been held to be subject to the limitations of the
First Amendment.'"1 The dissent claimed that the investigation had
restricted free speech by uncovering and stigmatizing expressions of unpopular views and by forcing people to express their views. "Freedom of
140. Id. at 90.
141. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
142. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Holmes, J., in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
143. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir.), cert, deniod,
334 U.S. 843 (1948).
144. The dissent cited cases where municipal license taxes which were applied
to the dissemination of religious literature were declared invalid as a denial of freedom
of speech, press and religion. Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette), 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Busey v. District of Columbia,
138 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir. 1943).
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speech is freedom in respect to speech and includes freedom not to
speak."' 45 Judge Edgerton was severely critical of the idea of Congress
punishing by exposure and obloquy. Rather than balance public interest
against private interest, the dissent would require a "clear and present
danger" before a person could be compelled to disclose his personal beliefs.
In concluding his free speech arguments, Judge Edgerton stated: "No
one denies that the inquest is an effective instrument of restraint. I hope
the last word has not been said on the question whether it is a legal one."'146
In 1949, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
various investigations conducted by the Un-American Activities Committee.147 Lawson v. United States,148 the most notable of the 1949 cases,
followed the Barsky decision and rejected the witness's contentions involving
the right of privacy and the freedom to remain silent as to beliefs and
associations.
In regard to the status of the First Amendment by 1951, as a limitation
on congressional investigations of subversive activities, a District Court
Judge reported:
Now, whatever may have been thought to have been the effect
of the First Amendment upon the right of a congressional committee to make inquiries relating to the activities, affiliations, and
associations of a witness, in the light of the Josephson case, in
the Second Circuit, and the Barsky case, in our own [District of
Columbia] Circuit, there can be no possible question in these
two jurisdictions, if indeed there can be in any other, that the
First Amendment does not preclude the Committee from asking
the questions here involved, nor does it justify the defendant in
refusing to answer them. (Footnotes omitted.)149
In 1953, the United States Supreme Court decided to give full hearing
to a congressional investigating case specifically involving the First Amendment plea. In United States v. Rumely, 50 the defendant was convicted
of refusing to answer questions propounded to him by the I-louse Committee
on Lobbying Activities. The witness was the secretary of an organization
engfiged in the sale of books of "a particular political tendentiousness."
The questions involved disclosure of names of persons who made bulk
purchases of these books for further distribution. The court of appeals
145. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 254 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948).
146. Id. at 260.
147. Marshal] v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.denied,
339 U.S. 933 (1950); Morford v. United States, 176 F.Zd 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd,
339 U.S. 258 (1950); Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950). The Morford case made no reference to the First
Amendment.
148. 176 F.Zd 241 (D.C.Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
149. United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491, 493 (D.D.C. 1951). It is
difficult to ascertain exactly what "the questions here involved" were. The court
merely stated that they were pertinent to the inquiry.
150. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
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reversed the conviction, basing its decision in part on the violation of
the First Amendment. 5 1 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, but
avoided deciding the constitutional question by holding that the phrase
"lobbying activities," as used in the authorizing resolution, did not apply
to the activities of defendant; hence, the committee was without statutory
power to extract the particular information. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring,
believed that the resolution did apply to defendant's activities, but that
the inquiry, by subjecting the press to harassment, abridged the First
Amendment.
In the interim between Runsely and Watkins, the First Amendment
as a defense to prosecution for refusal to testify traveled a rather rocky
road. 1-2 One court actually found a justifiable abridgement of defendant's
right to freedom of speech. 53 Another court rejected the First Amendment,

because the "requisite pertinency of specific questions existed.'' 5 4 On the
other hand, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
"Where a congressional investigation enters a field to which the First
Amendment is applicable, courts will be particularly careful to check
unlawful lines of inquiry.' 5 5' IHowever, in its next breath the court "remembered" that the right of free speech was not absolute, but yielded to national
interests of larger importance.
About the only favorable response to a First Amendment plea was
an incidental statement of the Supreme Court that the "power to investigate
cannot be used to inquire into private affairs unrelated to a valid legislative
purpose."'5 0 Even this pronouncement turned into a double-edged sword
as one lower federal court paraphrased the meaning so there could be
inquiry into private affairs where a valid legislative purpose did exist.

57

In Watkins v.United States the Supreme Court extensively discussed
the implications of the First Amendment, 58 but its consideration of the
151. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cit. 1952). It is interesting
to note that this opinion was written by Judge Prettyman, who rejected the First

Amendment arguments in the Barsky case. In Rumely, he recognized that there was
an impingement upon free speech in both cases, but he distinguished the cases on the

ground that the factor of public danger, such as the tenets of communism and the nature
of the Communist Party, was absent in Rumely.

152. See Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Sachet v.
United States, 240 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v, Lattimore, 215 F.2d
847 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); United
States v. Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832 (l.D.C. 1957): United States v. O'Connor, 135 F.
Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1955). The Barenblatt and Sacher cases were reviewed by the
Snpretne Court, remanded and reviewed a second time. For the final dispositions, see

Barenblatt v.United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sachet v. United States, 356 U.S.
576 (1958). For a commentary on congressional investigations in this period, see
Massey, Congressional Investigations and Individual Liberties, 25 U. CIN. L. REv.
323 (1956).
153. United States v. O'Connor, 135 F. Stpp. 590, 596 (D.D.C. 1955).
154. United States v. Knowles, 148 F. Supp. 832, 836 (D.D.C. 1955).
155. United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1953).
156. Quinn v. United States, 249 US. 155, 161 (1955).
157. Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For the
subsequent history of this case, see Rarenhlatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
158. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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problem appears to have had little or no bearing on the outcome of the
case. Mr. Chief Justice Warren subjected congressional investigations to
the First Amendment and contended that Congress could not expose for
the sake of exposure, but he recognized that not all inquiries into private
matters were barred. Despite the liberal spirit of the opinion, the Chief
Justice detracted from his own reasoning by perpetuating the balancing
of the interests test.15 Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, refused to find that
a general privilege of silence existed under the First Amendment or that
the private affairs of the witness had been invaded.
Almost immediately after the Watkins decision, a federal district
court in United States v. Peck1 ° decided a congressional investigating case
squarely on the basis of the First Amendment. This case appears to be
the only decision in which the witness successfully defended by the use
of the First Amendment.""
In the Peck case the Internal Security Subcommittee had interrogated
a newspaper man employed by the New York Times. The witness refused to
answer questions which would have required him to identify others as
Communists. The court discussed freedom of press, but did not decide the
case on that point. Rather, the court believed that there was no national
interest which would clearly justify an invasion of the individual's protected
freedoms of privacy, thought, and association. Even if there were a
sufficient national interest, the witness's First Amendment rights were
unconstitutionally infringed because of procedural defects in the investigation. The court then discussed the vagueness of the authorizing resolution
and consequently granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
Whatever potency this decision may have had, it was destined to dissipate
in the onrush of Barenblatt.
The majority in Barenblatt v. United States, true to its form on the
issues of vagueness and pertinency, diligently worked at restricting the
application of the First Amendment. Mr. justice Harlan admitted that
the First Amendment in some circumstances protects the witness from
being compelled to testify, but, unlike the plea of self-incrimination, the
First Amendment would not provide a right to resist inquiry in all
circumstances. Taking advantage of an injudicious statement by the Chief
Justice in Watkins, the majority held: "Where First Amendment rights
are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and
159. "The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to,
the interest of the Congress-in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness."
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 189 (1956).
160. 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957).
161. As mentioned previously, Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir.
1952), presented a successful application of the First Amendment as a defense, but
on review, the Supreme Court decided the case solely as one of statutory construction.
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
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public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown."'6 a2 In
applying the test the Court reaffirmed that a proper legislative purpose
existed in the investigation of communist activity and pointed to the fact
that the Communist Party has not been viewed as an ordinary political
party.' 03 In reply to a contention involving academic freedom, the majority
claimed that the investigation was directed at the advocacy of, or preparation
for, overthrow of the Government by force, rather than at controlling what
was being taught at universities. "The strict requirements of a prosecution
under the Smith Act . . . are not the measure of the permissible scope

of a congressional investigation into 'overthrow', for of necessity the
investigatory process must proceed step by step."'6 4 Since the inquiry
was found to be in aid of legislative process, the Court would not inquire
into the motives of the Committee members. This resulted in the Court's
discounting of the exposure argument. The majority further contended that
the subcommittee was not attempting to pillory Barenblatt and that it
had probable cause for the belief that the witness possessed valuable
information. In view of the foregoing, the Court struck the balance in
favor of the Government over the individual.
The dissent in Barenblatt was greatly disturbed over the manner in
which the Court treated the First Amendment freedoms and the matter
of exposure. Highly critical of the use the majority made of the balancing
of the interests doctrine, Mr. Justice Black maintained that the test
should be employed where the law primarily regulates conduct or action
and only indirectly affects speech, but not where the law directly abridges
the First Amendment freedoms. The Justice believed that the Court's
use of the balancing of the interest test "is closely akin to the notion
that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill of
Rights should be enforced unless the Court believes it is reasonable to do
so."'' 5 Even assuming that some balancing is proper, the dissent would
strike the balance in favor of Barenblatt's silence. In the eyes of the
minority, Barenblatt's interest is to be able to join organizations, advocate
causes, and make political "mistakes." However, the dissenters believed that
the obloquy which results from such investigations as the one in question
prevents all but the most courageous from expressing views which might
in time become disfavored. As to the Government's interest in selfpreservation, Mr. Justice Black contended:
The First Amendment means to me

. . .

that the only constitu-

tional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave the
people the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize or discuss,
as they see fit, all governmental policies and to suggest, if they
162. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
163. The Court cited Calvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
164. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 130 (1959).
165. Id. at 143.
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desire, that even its most fundamental postulates are bad and
should be changed: "Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government." (Footnote
omitted.) 166
The dissent also rejected the majority's argument which, by refusing to
recognize the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, in effect
declared that Party outlawed.
The fact is that once we allow any group which has some
political aims or ideas to be driven from the ballot and from the
battle for men's minds because some of its members are bad
and some of its tenets are illegal, no group is safe ...
Today's
holding, in my judgment, marks another major step in the progressively increasing retreat from the safeguards of the First
Amendment. 67
Mr. Justice Black's final arguments went to the element of exposure.
He contended that by the use of the devices of humiliation and public
shame to punish witnesses, the Un-American Activities Committee was
undertaking a judicial function on a scale greater than that condemned
in the Kilbourn case. The minority noted that the Committee was
punishing by exposure many phases of "un-American" activities which
the Committee itself reported could not be reached by legislation, by
administrative action, or by any other agency of the Government, including
the courts. The dissent also indicated that the Committee violated the
bill of attainder provision of the United States Constitution. In summary
Mr. Justice Black opined:
Ultimately all the questions in this case boil down to onewhether we as a people will try fearfully and futilely to preserve
Democracy by adopting totalitarian methods, or whether in
accordance with our traditions and our Constitution we will have
the confidence and courage to be free. 68
IV.

CONCLUSION

In view of Watkins, how does one account for Barenblatt? If one
ruthlessly disregards as obiter dicta the First Amendment and vagueness
arguments by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Watkins and restricts the holding
in that case to the issue of pertinency, then technically the case can be
reconciled with Barenblatt. But, certainly the approach and spirit of the
two decisions are inconsistent. It is perhaps unfortunate that the facts
were sufficiently different in the two cases so that the situation of Mr.
Watkins could generate much more sympathy than that of Mr. Barenblatt.
Putting the constitutional and legal arguments aside, the facts in themselves
166. Id. at 145-46.

167. Id. at 150, 151.52.
168. Id. at 168.
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might justify the result reached in each case. 69 One might also look at the
composition of the Court and the positions of its members iii the two cases
in attempting to rationalize the results. The majority in Watkins consisted
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and
Brennan. Of these all but Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Barenblatt.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in Watkins on grounds limited
to the pertinency issue, and Mr. Justice Clark, who dissented in Watkins,
were in the majority in Barenblatt. Justices Burton and Vhittakcr took
no part in the consideration or decision of XVatkins. Justices Whittaker
and Stewart, the latter having replaced Mr. Justice Burton, were also
in the majority in Barenblatt. Hence, with the sole exception of Mr. Justice
Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion in Barenblatt, the positions of
the several justices in the two cases cannot be said to be inconsistent.
One can only speculate as to what induced Mr. Justice Harlan to agree
with the majority in Watkins and then desert his colleagues in Barenblatt.
If this could be detennined, the enigma of Watkins vis-,-vis Barenblatt
would be solved.
Although the puzzle of reconciling Watkins and Barenblatt may never
be satisfactorily pieced together, we can, nevertheless, try to resolve the
problem posed at the beginning of this article, i.e. assuming the plea
of self-incrimination has serious disadvantages, what legal and constitutional
defenses are available to a witness who must face a congressional investigating
committee.
As far as the investigation of un-American activities is concerned,
vagueness no longer appears to be a vice. Undoubtedly, both the UnAmerican Activities Committee and the Internal Security Subcommittee
are functioning pursuant to a valid exercise of legislative power and under

sufficiently definite authorizing resolutions. As to future congressional
investigations into other areas, it would seem wise for a witness to challenge
the authorizing resolutions before they have had an opportunity to obtain
a "legislative gloss" which may cure any initial defects.
An objection to pertinency, seasonably made, apparently is the witness's
strongest weapon, for he can compel his interrogators to divulge the subject
matter of the investigation and how the questions relate thereto. Such
an objection, of course, will not suffice where the Un-American Activities
Committee or the Internal Security Subcommittee asks a witness if he
himself is or has been a Communist, but beyond this the objection is
applicable. If the objection is not seasonably made, the Government still
must prove pertinency as an element of the criminal offense, but this
appears to be easily achieved by showing the surrounding circumstances of
the investigation.

169. See text on p. 387 and pp. 390-91 supra.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING POWER

The defense of the First Amendment has been in a state of flux,
but the cycle seems to have been completed so that the courts are, in
effect, back to the days of Josephson and Barsky. It is interesting to note
that both sides have made concessions. The "conservatives" agree that the
First Amendment may be a bar in some instances, while the "liberals"
maintain that the First Amendment does not bar all investigations. Some
sort of no-man's land appears to have been created. The clue to solving
this dilemma, at least as far as the majority is concerned, is the balancing
of the interests test, By the Court's use of this test, the First Amendment
offers little relief in the investigation of un-American activities, but inasmuch
as the Court places communism in a special category, it seems safe to
presume that the First Amendment as a defense has vitality in other fields
of investigation.
There seems to be no doubt but that the congressional investigation
serves a necessary and useful function. However, the power of Congress
is susceptible to causing irreparable damage to individuals who must
appear before the committee of inquiry. Since the line of demarcation
between the fact finding function and the quasi-judicial exercise of power
is very tenuous, it seems inevitable that to a certain extent the witness
is always on trial. Consequently, he should be entitled to certain procedural
and substantive safeguards.
It has been suggested that Congress promulgate a set of rules of
investigating procedure, possibly similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
170
and Criminal Procedure or analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act.
In addition, the Supreme Court could re-evaluate and consolidate its
position on the defenses of vagueness, pertinency, and the First Amendment
as they pertain to the investigatory power. The high tribunal could establish
its position in a case not beclouded by the communist issue, lest the
Court's philosophy on subversive activities serve as precedent for congressional investigations in general.

170. "[Tlie need for Congress to prescribe a general code of fair procedures for
its investigating committees remains great .... ." CARR, H'nEIoUsE COIMITTEF ON
UNq-AMERICAN ACerITIEs 462 (1952). A summary of various proposals appears in
Galloway, Proposed Reforms, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 478 (1951). See especially Mr.
Galloway's appendix of proposed safeguards. Galloway, supra at 196-98.

